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Abstract
Sophisticated mass attacks, especially when exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, have the potential
to cause destructive damage to organizations and critical infrastructure. To timely detect and contain
such attacks, collaboration among the defenders is critical. By correlating real-time detection
information (alerts) from multiple sources (collaborative intrusion detection), defenders can detect
attacks and take the appropriate defensive measures in time. However, although the technical tools to
facilitate collaboration exist, real-world adoption of such collaborative security mechanisms is still
underwhelming. This is largely due to a lack of trust and participation incentives for companies and
organizations. This paper proposes TRIDEnT, a novel collaborative platform that aims to enable and
incentivize parties to exchange network alert data, thus increasing their overall detection capabilities.
TRIDEnT allows parties that may be in a competitive relationship, to selectively advertise, sell and
acquire security alerts in the form of (near) real-time peer-to-peer streams. To validate the basic
principles behind TRIDEnT, we present an intuitive game-theoretic model of alert sharing, that is of
independent interest, and show that collaboration is bound to take place infinitely often. Furthermore,
to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we instantiate our design in a decentralized manner
using Ethereum smart contracts and provide a fully functional prototype.
“No one can build his security upon the nobleness of another person”
– Willa Cather, Alexander’s Bridge
1 Introduction
In recent years, cyber-attacks have grown in impact and have affected millions of people and organizations
all over the world. Recent examples, like the infamous Wannacry ransomware attack [Ehr17] and the
Mirai Internet of Things (IoT) botnet [AAB+17], incurred losses calculated to amount to hundreds of
millions of US Dollars [Bur16]. Other attacks were aimed at acquiring restricted data, like the so-called
Red October malware which stole vital information from government and research institutions. The
latter operated undetected for five years, according to Kaspersky estimates [Kas13]. Similar attacks are
provisioned to become more common and disruptive, since attacker incentives grow as more people
depend on interconnected devices (IoT) and critical infrastructure components. Worryingly, all attacks
mentioned above were relatively simple, using known “old” vulnerabilities (e.g. Wannacry used the
infamous NSA-related EternalBlue exploit), yet caused significant disruption. Mass attacks exploiting
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yet-unknown (zero-day) vulnerabilities can have orders of magnitude larger attack surface and therefore
be destructive.
To timely detect signs of attacks and take appropriate action, firms and organizations use, among
other countermeasures, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). IDSs utilize techniques like signature
matching (e.g. Snort [Roe99] and Bro [Pax99]), or sophisticated anomaly-based detection algorithms for
the detection of unknown attacks (zero-days) [CBK09]. However, given the advancing complexity and
severity of attacks, isolated IDSs that only monitor one part of the network are not adequately effective.
Attackers may have objectives that require a series of steps, including information gathering (e.g. mass
network scans) and vulnerability assessment that may not be treated as a threat when viewed in isolation.
Consequently, these complex, multi-step intrusion attempts (e.g. Advanced Persistent Threats) can only be
detected by correlating information from different parts of the network [CM02]. Transfer of information
is also of notable benefit in scenarios where adversaries mount mass attacks targeting a large number of
defenders by utilizing similar techniques (e.g. the same zero-day vulnerability). Early warning signs (e.g.
in the form of a network trace, a malicious URL or IP address) from defenders that were targeted by a
given attack can greatly benefit others against (similar) future attacks against them. The latter scenario
is particularly important, since such mass attacks are widespread in the wild [AMW17], and as already
noted, can have destructive consequences. Threat intelligence sharing is therefore critical in defending
against modern attacks, as it greatly enhances the defensive capabilities of isolated IDSs.
The topic of collaborative security through security alert sharing and correlation has attracted research
interest in itself, with a variety of proposals on exchange mechanisms [VKMF15, ZLK10, MLZ+15,
LPS04], and standardization efforts [WE07, Dan16]. On the one hand, such proposals allow the ex-
changed data to retain its utility, and on the other hand protect the source of the alerts by filtering out
sensitive information (e.g. IP addresses). However, there is still great reluctance from companies and
organizations to share alert data, as financial incentives for doing so are not clear. This further highlights
the central role of (security) economics [And01, AM06] in any real-world security problem. Companies
are reluctant to engage in sharing activities, due to the fact that their competitors can take advantage of
their (financial) investments in the detection effort and the ensuing sharing process, i.e. competitors may
free-ride1. Apart from the basic cost of personnel and hardware/software resources dedicated to maintain-
ing the sharing infrastructure, information leakage when openly publishing (even anonymized) alerts may
lead to additional risks. These can come in the form of law-infringement violations [TSM+15] or leaking
information to an attacker concerning the defender’s location and defensive capabilities [SW07]. Finally,
distrust among the participants further aggravates privacy concerns, while also limiting confidence in the
received information. For these reasons, investment in Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDSs)
is viewed cautiously by companies and organizations [Pon18].
As recounted above, incentive issues have considerably limited the adoption of such collaborative
systems, even though political initiatives (e.g. by the US federal government and the EU – see e.g.
PROTECTIVE [pro18]) highly encourage the practice. Note that the lack of incentives is detrimental in
this case because, contrary to other systems that work and rely on the selfless behavior of community
members (e.g. the Tor network), in the case of security alert sharing the main stakeholders are companies
that operate with selfish, rather than altruistic motives. Existing threat intelligence sharing platforms (e.g.
MISP [WDWI16], IBM’s “X-Force Exchange”2, or Facebook’s “ThreatExchange”3) do not consider
incentives and trust, and are intended to be operated by central trusted third parties. The latter is an
important limitation, since organizations (or even governments) in any kind of a competitive relationship,
will be uneasy providing valuable data to services fully controlled by their competitors.
Motivated by the aforementioned challenges, we proceed to investigate and address the lack of incen-
1Actually free-riding is the Nash equilibrium in many security information sharing models [LB17]
2https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/
3https://developers.facebook.com/programs/threatexchange/
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tives for security information sharing. In particular, we introduce TRIDEnT (Trustworthy collaboRative
Intrusion DETection), a novel alert4 exchange platform that aims to enable and incentivize parties to
exchange network alert data. Specifically, TRIDEnT introduces an open, carefully designed alert market-
place that offers the required functionality and incentives for entities to share alert data, while providing
the environment for trust relations between them to develop. To formally investigate the incentives issues
of network alert sharing, we provide a novel game-theoretic model that acts as a validation for the basic
principles of our marketplace design. Finally, we show the feasibility of our proposal by providing a
decentralized prototype on top of the Ethereum smart contracts platform.
We believe that this work is a sizeable step forward towards understanding the economic challenges
of deploying collaborative security mechanisms and providing the required infrastructures to enable
collaboration among competitors without requiring trust on a single service provider. Our contributions
can be summarized by the following points:
The TRIDEnT platform design: TRIDEnT is a collaborative platform for alert data sharing that
facilitates the creation of P2P channels for collaboration among interested parties. In TRIDEnT, alert
producers offer their data in the form of live streams, selectively to parties of their choice, thus creating
a sharing overlay based on their trust relations. To attract interested collaborators, they advertise their
streams by including information about the data, in the form of tags. For example, producers may
advertise tags relating to the type of attacks (e.g. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), malware), the
detector (e.g. IDS, honeypot), the type of network (e.g. backbone, corporate), and so on. Interested parties
can buy streams with some form of currency5 to pay the producers and start streaming in real time. A
rating and trust management system is included to ensure that participants offer good quality alert data.
Game-theoretic model of alert exchange: To validate the core principles behind TRIDEnT, we introduce
an intuitive game-theoretic model of network alert sharing, where two rational selfish defenders try to
optimize their payoff against an attacker who performs attacks stochastically. We pinpoint a pattern of
attacks that leads to the exchange of information and we show that this pattern repeats infinitely often,
and thus collaboration is bound to take place. Our model differs from other proposed models for security
collaboration (e.g. [ZFBB12] and [JHD17]) in that it assumes a competitive relation between selfish
players that are only interested in sharing information if it will minimize their expected costs. Thus,
security collaboration is not viewed as a matter of good will or legislative pressure, rather as a self-serving
action. Furthermore, our model differs from other strategic information sharing games (e.g. [LB17]),
in that the act of sharing information is not considered to be “for free” (as processing and privacy leaks
incur costs).
Instantiation on Ethereum: We showcase the feasibility of our system in an open, decentralized setting
(anyone can participate), with an implementation on the Ethereum platform. For readers unfamiliar
with the basic functionality of Ethereum, a brief overview is given in Section 2. We describe the design
along with the basic components of the prototype and show that transaction fees incurred by the system
are projected to remain negligible. Note that the same design can straightforwardly be adapted to a
permissioned setting, e.g. by implementing it on Hyperledger Fabric [Cac16], in the case of a closed
group of known, yet selfish and competitive organizations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers some background information,
required for the comprehension of the paper. Section 3 presents the collaborative platform and focuses
on its architecture and operations. Afterwards, in Section 4 we validate the core ideas of TRIDEnT in a
game-theoretical model of independent interest. Then, Section 5 presents a prototype implementation of
4When we refer to alerts, we generally include any information (human or machine-produced) that can be used in threat
detection or mitigation.
5For the rest of the paper we refer to the exchange medium as the TRIDEnT token, however any currency can be used, i.e. a
dedicated token is not technically necessary with our existing incentives analysis. However, we do not rule out that a dedicated
token with regulated supply can be beneficial in other game-theoretic models.
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TRIDEnT and its evaluation. Section 6 goes over the related work, Section 7 discusses limitation of our
work, while Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section we provide some basic background about i) collaborative security and ii) Ethereum and
smart contracts.
Collaborative Security and CIDSs The term collaborative security is an encapsulation of the idea
that combining knowledge from different sources can be of benefit for the detection and mitigation of
attacks. The reasoning behind this argument is well studied [ZLK10], and can be summarized in the
following: detectors, e.g., anomaly detection algorithms, can be improved by enhancing the input data,
alert correlation is more effective when the data volume increases, a number of attacks, e.g., malware
spreading, can be contained even before seen locally when they are anticipated as a result of collaboration.
For instance, Bo¨ck et al. [BVMK18] recently showed that correlation of data from different sensors is
necessary to enumerate advanced P2P botnets. Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDSs) further
formulate the aforesaid idea by implementing it in the form of a system [VKMF15]. Besides academic
work, e.g., [VKC+15, FZAB11], there have been various attempts to realize CIDSs [Ull00, pro18].
Nevertheless, the majority of the proposed systems are either theoretical or assume that participants are
trusted and are willing to collaborate.
Ethereum and smart contracts Ethereum [Woo14] is a decentralized platform (distributed ledger)
for Turing-complete applications, facilitated by smart contracts, with a native cryptocurrency called
ether. The state of the platform is collectively maintained by its users via a consensus mechanism, thus
guaranteeing its correct operation under reasonable security assumptions (honest majority of computing
power and relatively good network connectivity). Thus, the platform is as if it were operated by a trusted
party with public internal state. Smart contracts can be written in high level languages (e.g., Solidity),
compiled and executed by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) which can be thought of as a large
decentralized computer, spread across the world. A smart contract can be deployed by issuing a “deploy”
transaction to the network, and functions of the smart contract can be called by referencing the address
where the contract is stored in the ledger. Transactions are statements issued by a party, signed by the
party’s secret key sk, and sent to the network. They can either invoke functions in a contract, transfer
ether between accounts, or deploy new contracts. Because data stored in the ledger is replicated among
all participants, and code affecting this data has to be executed by all participants, each transaction incurs
a gas cost to the issuing party, depending on the “work” the participants have to invest in processing it
(e.g., the computational complexity of the operations). Each operation in the EVM’s instruction set is
associated with a specific gas cost, and the issuing party has to include a corresponding offer of ether per
gas unit consumed, in order to incentivize the network to run the computations requested and update the
global state.
3 The TRIDEnT sharing platform
We begin the presentation of our platform by familiarizing the reader with its basic components and
their interaction, along with a high-level overview of their functionality. We then proceed to describe in
more detail the more interesting parts and design choices. An avid reader can infer all details about our
platform from the smart contract pseudocode of our implementation (see Section 5).
3.1 System architecture and overview
TRIDEnT can be conceptually dissected into the following layers:
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Organization A (buyer)
Marketplace
3. Query ratings
Trust Management
2. Query data sources
4. Subscribe
6. Rate alert quality
Distributed Ledger
Data overlay
5. Stream
Organization B (seller)
1. Advertise
Figure 1: TRIDEnT workflow.
Distributed Ledger Layer: The system is built on top of a distributed ledger (DL), e.g. the Ethereum
platform [Woo14], which offers strong consistency and availability guarantees and allows participants to
execute arbitrary (Turing-complete) operations on its state. This is the base layer of the framework and
lays the trust foundations for the following layers, emulating a trusted third party. The benefits of using a
DL as a sharing infrastructure have been documented recently [AVIM17, WHH+18].
Trust Management Layer: As participants can behave maliciously at times and towards certain parties,
a trust management mechanism (i.e. generalized reputation system) is necessary to support good behavior.
Ratings from buyers follow transactions (stream establishment), and are stored on the DL. At each time,
a peer is able to calculate a local trust score for each other peer, via a trust calculation algorithm of her
choice. In our design (see Section 3.3) we use an adaptation of the Bayesian mechanism of [Rie07].
Marketplace Layer: The system provides economic incentives for honest behavior by utilizing a
token-based economic mechanism. Tokens can be thought of as a currency special to the system, used to
buy streams from other participants. In the case where a native cryptocurrency is offered by an underlying
distributed ledger, then this can be used as a token. A game-theoretic justification for the alert marketplace
can be found in Section 4.
Data Overlay Layer: After establishing a connection, a seller and a buyer open a channel where alert
data and tokens are exchanged. Multiple such channels create sharing overlays. We employ off-chain
transactions (see the Raiden network6) to enable seamless and near-instantaneous token transfers.
An intuitive description of the basic functionalities of the platform, along with the connections among
the layers can be seen in Figure 1. A simplified example operation scenario follows. Organization B,
acting as an alert seller advertises the information he can offer (e.g. alerts from his industrial IDS) on the
marketplace. Organization A, acting as an alert buyer (i.e. party interested in acquiring alert data) queries
the marketplace where advertisements of alert streams are posted. The buyer also computes trust scores
for each seller by consulting previous ratings, and decides whether she wants to make a subscription
offer matching a stream’s requested price. Assuming the buyer makes an offer for a stream, and the
corresponding seller decides to accept it (the seller can also consult the buyer’s trust score as risk in these
transactions is bidirectional), a data stream and a payment channel are established. The buyer may now
rate the stream (and indirectly the seller) based on its perceived quality and whether or not it matches the
advertisement. The rating is stored on the ledger. Details about the platform’s operation follow.
6https://raiden.network/
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3.2 Marketplace functionality
The core functionality of the platform is summarized by the marketplace function definitions of Ta-
ble 1, which are to be instantiated by a smart contract. Our actual instantiation of these functions is
reserved for Section 5. Users register on the platform by providing their public key and “burning” a
reasonable amount of ether to create an initial trust value (register). Then they can advertise streams
(advertise), make offers (mkOffer) for existing advertisements, or accept offers (accOffer) for
their own advertisements. In particular, when making an offer, a security deposit has to be provided in
order to incentivize the act of providing ratings (see below). The marketplace also offers functionality
for deleting offers (delOffer) and unsubscribing from streams (unsubscribe), while enforcing the
necessary constraints. Finally, ratings can be provided via calling the rate function. A deposit is used to
incentivize buyers to provide ratings for streams. Note that our design is generic and can in theory provide
incentives and trust for any kind of information sharing platform. However, security information sharing
is particularly challenging, as it will become obvious in the following paragraphs, and we therefore focus
on it. In the remainder of this section we present some notable characteristics of TRIDEnT’s operation.
Function Description Constraints
register used for initial registration
burns ether
advertise create new advert. with
chosen tags
rmAdvert remove given advert.
+ related offers and subscr.
mkOffer create offer for given advert. deposit has to be provided
delOffer delete given offer caller has to be the advert.
publisher or offer creator
accOffer delete offer and create subscr. caller has to be the advert.
publisher
unsubscribe delete subscription caller has to be the advert.
publisher or the subscriber
rate add rating only one rating/subscr.
caller has to be subscriber
timer must not be expired
Table 1: Marketplace function definitions with constraints.
Alert advertisement format: An alert advertisement includes three important characteristics of the
stream, namely the expected mean throughput of the stream (e.g. alerts per hour), the price of streaming
(e.g. tokens per alert batch), and a list of strings (tags) offering information on the type and origins of
the alerts in the stream. A simple example is shown in Table 2. Note that the formats presented in this
section serve as simple abstract templates to showcase the functionality of TRIDEnT, meaning that they
can be readily enhanced as required.
With regard to the tags, we have classified this information into three categories: (i) type of the
detector (e.g. honeypot, IDS, firewall, etc.), (ii) type of the network (e.g., university network, home
network, backbone), and (iii) type of observed attacks (e.g., DDoS attacks, malware, botnet, APTs,
port scans, etc.). Here we note that the third type of information is valid only for streams that provide
historical data (not live data). Whereas in first inspection, it may seem useless to enable exchange of stale
alerts in our system, this is often useful. For example, companies specializing in developing solutions
for detecting and anticipating specific kinds of attacks would be very interested in alerts that have been
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labeled accordingly.
Advertising and subscribing to streams. Participants of the CIDS can subscribe to alert streams
of other parties and also advertise their own streams on the ledger. Participants are typically IDSs or
honeypots but also other CIDSs or humans, e.g., security experts. For the CIDS as a whole, it is desirable
that parties who consume alert data from the other parties, also provide their own data. An advertisement
contains the id of the publisher that can be used to calculate her trust value, and tags that describe which
kind of alerts the subscriber can expect, as explained above. This allows the node to browse all available
alert streams.
Publisher: GoodIDS
Expected throughput: 10/hour
Price: 1$/alert
Detector type: IDS
Type of network: industrial
Type of attacks: DDoS, botnet
Table 2: Example advertisement.
Stream establishment and operation. Figure 2 presents the stream establishment protocol of TRIDEnT,
involving a Buyer, a Seller and the system’s smart contract, which facilitates operations. First, involved
parties create and register a (public) key to be used for authentication and encryption. In practice, an
implementation of OpenPGP (e.g. GnuPG) could be used for all cryptographic operations in this protocol,
potentially with different keys for authentication and encryption, as per standard practice. Upon deciding
to make an offer for a stream corresponding to an advertisement Si, the Buyer calls the mkOffer
function of the smart contract, thus transmitting the offer to the DL. Upon deciding to accept the offer,
the seller publishes on the ledger the signed and encrypted address of the socket (IP address, port) where
the buyer can connect to start streaming. The address is encrypted with the buyer’s public key (initialized
upon registration) and ensuing connections to the socket (assuming initial authentication is successful)
are encrypted and authenticated. Execution paths concerning decisions not to accept the offer are pruned
from Figure 2 for brevity.
TRIDEnT, as a basic infrastructure, can be used to share any kind of security-related information
(malware signatures, software vulnerabilities, etc.) However, in this paper we focus on network alerts,
generated by IDSs such as Snort or anomaly detection systems, given in a suitable format for exchange
that can be readily processed. We propose the state-of-the-art STIX format [OAS17], although other
formats could also be used. For a comparison of alert exchange formats see [MP18]. A general template
is given in Table 3. A specific STIX alert in JSON format signaling a malicious URL follows in Table 4.
We refer the reader to the documentation of STIX7 for a more detailed description. TRIDEnT is agnostic
to the specific format used.
In order to support real-time micro-payments, we employ off-chain payment channels, as provided by
the Raiden Network. Specifically we utilize the µ-Raiden variant, which supports only one receiver but is
simpler and cheaper in terms of transaction costs. A uni-directional payment channel is created upon
successful establishment of a stream between the buyer and the seller. Subsequent payments take place
via the channel, thus allowing per-alert payments with practically zero transaction fees.
7https://stixproject.github.io/about/
8https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/examples
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Stream establishment protocol (SE)
Buyer Contract Seller
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(skS , pkS)← Gen(1n)
register(pkS)←−−−−−−−−−−
(skB , pkB)← Gen(1n)
register(pkB)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
off = mkOffer(Si)
m← SigskS (ip:port)
c← EncpkS (m)
accOffer(off, c)←−−−−−−−−−−
read(c)
ip:port← Dec(c)
connect(ip:port)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
nonce←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
ss← SigskB (nonce)
ss−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vf(ss, nonce, pkB)
?
= 1
accept and start streaming←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vf(ss, nonce, pkB)
?
= 0
reject and drop←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 2: Stream channel establishment via a smart contract. Notation follows standard practice, with
Gen the key generation operation (with security parameter 1n), Sig the digital signature operation, Enc
and Dec the operations of encryption and decryption, and Vf signature verification. Typewriter font is
used for calls to the marketplace functions.
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Time: creation/sending time
Source: origin of attack
Target: target of attack
Classification: name and/or CVE
Assessment: e.g. severity, potential impact, etc.
Table 3: Generic alert format.
{
“type”: “indicator”,
“id”: “indicator–9299f726-ce06-492e-8472-2b52ccb53191”,
“created by ref”: “identity–39012926-a052-44c4-ae48-. . . ”,
“created”: “2017-02-27T13:57:10.515Z”,
“modified”: “2017-02-27T13:57:10.515Z”,
“name”: “Malicious URL”,
“description”: “This URL is potentially associated with malicious activity and is listed on several
blacklist sites.”,
“pattern”: “[url:value = ’http://paypa1.banking.com’]”,
“valid from”: “2015-06-29T09:10:15.915Z”,
“labels”: [“malicious-activity”]
}
Table 4: Example STIX alert (JSON format). More examples can be found in the docs8.
3.3 Building trust
As recounted earlier, trust among the participants of collaborative security mechanisms is of paramount
importance. The decentralized smart-contract-based design of TRIDEnT does not require a trusted party
to act as the operator of the sharing service, thus avoiding the need for the participants’ reliance on a
common provider. However, some parties might try to profit from the streams of the other parties while
themselves providing fake or bad quality data. There is also a risk of malicious participants that may try
to destroy the CIDS, e.g., by providing wrong alert data or by bad-mouthing honest parties. Therefore,
some form of trust management, such as a reputation system, is required in order to protect participants
from malicious insiders that disseminate low quality, malformed, or misleading alerts. TRIDEnT comes
with a built-in trust bootstrapping and rating system, thus providing the foundations for trust assessment.
Trust bootstrapping: Since new parties may enter the system at any time (TRIDEnT is meant to be an
open system), a way to bootstrap their standing in the community is needed, even if they do not have real-
world social ties to other participants. At the same time, this bootstrapping mechanism should mitigate
sybil attacks. In TRIDEnT, trust bootstrapping is achieved via Proof-of-burn. To register in the system, a
participant “burns” an amount of cryptocurrency in order to prove her commitment to the community.
Cryptocurrency “burning” refers to the act of rendering an amount of currency provably un-spendable,
equivalent to actual burning of currency notes. The amount required to achieve a baseline trust value and
start interacting in the TRIDEnT community should remain low in order not to be considered an entry
barrier for new participants. On the other hand, the amount required to achieve considerably higher initial
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trust should increase quickly, as to make it difficult for malicious participants to acquire high initial trust
and harm the system. The exact baseline amount is a deployment decision, not addressed in this paper.
Rating: Transaction ratings are a widely used and empirically effective tool for building trust in
marketplace environments. Rating in TRIDEnT is intertwined with the other marketplace operations.
After a stream is established, the buyer can rate the seller by calling the rate function of the smart
contract. This rating is thus part of the global state of the underlying Distributed Ledger (DL) and
therefore visible to all participants. After the stream is closed, the buyer can finalize her rating by calling
the rate function once again. This is to disallow sellers to provide good quality data up until they are
rated positively, and then decrease quality. The perceived quality of a stream depends on whether data
provided are judged to be real, useful, and corresponding to its advertisement.
A major problem faced by rating systems is user unwillingness/laziness to provide ratings, especially
in the case where it involves extra effort or possible additional transaction fees. In TRIDEnT, users are
monetarily incentivized to provide ratings by mechanisms built in the system. Specifically, upon making
an offer, the buyer deposits a small but not negligible fixed fee to the marketplace smart contract. This fee
is returned to the buyer if the offer is rejected or, in two rounds, upon submitting a rating. It is easy to
see that if the fixed fee is considerably larger than the transaction fee required to call the rate function,
buyers are incentivized to follow up any purchase with a rating.
The mechanism described above and implemented in our system, offers clear incentives for buyers to
submit ratings. However, incentives for providing correct ratings may also be needed. Although these
fall outside of the scope of this paper, TRIDEnT can straightforwardly support algorithms proposed in
literature to overcome this problem, e.g. the elegant idea proposed by Jurca and Faltings [JF03]. The
idea is to establish a side-payment channel organized by a set of broker agents that buy and sell ratings.
They reward (pay) an agent who submitted a rating if the following rating (coming from another agent)
agrees with hers. Under well-defined assumptions (the next experience is more likely to be the same as
the previous: Pr[Cit+1|Cjt ] > 0.5 for i = j), truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium. In TRIDEnT, no
broker agents are required; the mechanism can be added to the existing protocol and executed by smart
contracts. In this sense, TRIDEnT is an extensible platform.
Local trust computation: The local trust computation algorithm employed by each party to decide
whether or not to engage in exchange activities with another party is subject to choice, and technically not
part of the core TRIDEnT infrastructure. Generally, trust decisions in this setting are more complex than
just computing a reputation score and require human engagement. However, we still consider trust scores
as valuable decision-supporting tools, and in our instantiation we use an adapted version of CertainTrust
(CT) [Rie07] to calculate a trust score for each participant. In contrast to simplistic “average rating” trust
representations, CT, since it is based on Bayesian statistics principles, can model the perceived accuracy
of the derived trust value, as well as incorporate prior information (corresponding to Bayesian priors).
More details about our construction follow.
(Bayesian evidence-based trust assessment:) In the Bayesian representation of CertainTrust / Certain-
Logic [Rie07, RHMV11, Hau15], trust is calculated as the expectation/probability:
E = ce · t+ (1− ce) · f (1)
where t is the point estimate of the (probability of success) parameter of a binomial distribution, f is the
a priori expectation of the same parameter, and ce is a factor that “fades” the effect of the prior value,
as more pieces of evidence are taken into account, in accordance with Bayesian statistical inference.
Evidence in this model are either positive or negative experiences (binary ratings). The number of positive
and negative experiences is denoted by r and s respectively, and n = r + s. The mapping between the
evidence space (r, s) and the Bayesian probability space is given by:
t =
{
r
r+s if r + s > 0
0 else
(2)
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Figure 3: Comparison of proof-of-burn candidate functions.
ce =

0 if n = 0
N ·n
2·w·(N−n)+N ·n if 0 < n < N
1 if n ≥ N
(3)
where w is a normalizing value we set to 1, and N is a user-set threshold number of evidence needed
to achieve a desired level of significance of the estimate (in the sense of a confidence interval – see
Appendix A for details on how to compute a mathematically sound N). It is easy to see from Eq. (3) that
the value of ce increases with increasing number of evidence n, as intended.
(A-priori trust through proof-of-burn:) We consider the PoB-derived baseline trust as the Bayesian a
priori expectation f regarding the trustworthiness of an entity. The function f∗ : r ∈ R+ → f ∈ [0, 1],
relating the amount of cryptocurrency units burned, and the resulting baseline trust, where r = xc the
fraction of the amount of cryptocurrency burned and c the baseline value for achieving initial trust of 0.5,
should satisfy the following properties:
f∗(0) = 0, f∗(1) =
1
2
, lim
r→∞ f
∗(r) = 1, f∗
′
(r) > 0, f∗
′′
(r) < 0 (4)
After considering different functions, we arrive at the definition of f∗ ≡ f1, with:
f1(r) = 1− 1
1 + log2(r + 1)
(5)
The definition of f1 satisfies the properties of Eq. (4), and additionally, its growth rate is suitable to our
needs. In Figure 3, both f1 and f2 = 1− (12)r (proposed in [Zin14]), are depicted. We see that f1 rises
faster up to the value of 0.5, and then its growth rate drops significantly, especially with respect to f2. By
adopting f1, users will be able to acquire a baseline trust value of 0.5 by spending a reasonable fee, but to
acquire significantly larger initial trust, they will have to pay exponentially more. Even by paying 20
times the default fee, their initial trust would not be much higher than 0.8.
3.4 Privacy discussion
TRIDEnT, by design, offers increased privacy assurances for participants by allowing the formation
of P2P overlays based on trust, rather than indiscreetly publishing alert data. Alerts are assumed to
be sanitized according to best practices (e.g.,[LPS04]), limiting the exposure of private information to
collaborators, and the cost of sharing privacy-sensitive information is taken into account in the game-
theoretic analysis of the following section. Furthermore, alert sanitization could be executed depending
on the trust relation between the collaborators, allowing for less sanitized – more valuable alerts to flow,
as trust between collaborators grows. Techniques offering anonymous payments and privacy-preserving
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reputation (e.g., [SBHB16]) could prove beneficial to our design, but are out of our current scope of
research. Overall, our system offers a solid foundation for data exchange, able to support existing and
upcoming privacy-enhancing techniques based on alert sanitization, bloom filters etc., which are not the
focus of this paper.
3.5 Attacks and defenses
Apart from the usual attacks and corresponding defenses against trust / reputation systems in the market-
place context (see e.g. [HZNR09]), there are some specific notable issues that TRIDEnT is faced with,
that may not be obvious on first sight.
Target bad-mouthing attack: In this scenario, the adversary attempts to artificially lower the reputation
of the target party, so that he can discredit her reporting competence before attacking her. This way, the
adversary would be able to lower the chance of the attack evidence being spread among the defenders.
The most common way of performing such an attack is creating multiple identities and giving a lot of
negative ratings. Since joining the system comes at a non-negligible cost and submitting a rating requires
starting a stream, which incurs respectable costs, the attack is expensive for an adversary to perform, and
not scalable. Remember, that the principal aim of TRIDEnT is to mitigate mass attacks, not targeted ones.
Stream reselling: In this attack, an adversary resells alerts he has bought from sellers, to other parties.
Apart from this being a problem for the incentives mechanism (the reseller can practically free-ride), this
attack can also compromise the security of the system, as alerts may contain sensitive information and
are intended for use by the designated recipient. Enforcing watermarking on security alerts seems almost
impossible, as the distinctive information would be easy to locate and remove. A solution with the use of
fake alerts as watermarking would also reduce the value of the alerts as a whole, which goes against the
goals of the system. Therefore, defense against reselling attacks relies on the same mechanism as defense
against low-quality alerts, i.e. the trust management system already described in the previous sections.
Hence, sellers also face risk and should assess their trust in their buyers. That being said, studying the
reselling attack in isolation is a challenging open problem for the community. For example, mechanisms
that would allow honest buyers to discern resellers could be valuable for the system. One could envision
a solution where honest participants continuously and randomly check a subset of a node’s incoming and
outgoing streams to detect resells. This check could be performed in a privacy-preserving manner via
secure multiparty computation. These solutions could of course find applications in other data sharing
applications.
Although a very challenging attack to fully rule out, reselling also comes with some boundaries that
practically reduce its effect. Most notably, a seller offering a huge amount of streams (due to reselling),
would be very suspicious, and thus would not be preferred by buyers.
After presenting the basic functionality of TRIDEnT, we proceed to validate the basic principles behind it
with a formal probabilistic model.
4 A probabilistic and game-theoretic approach
This section presents a simplified mathematical model of our ecosystem. The purpose is not to describe
the ecosystem in a comprehensive manner; rather we present a model where several relevant phenomena
still occur, including regular exchange of information.
Our model has five abstract parameters: low and high probabilities to be attacked, cost of sharing
information, cost of preparing to defend, and cost of being attacked unprepared. Each of these abstract
parameters corresponds to several real-world parameters. For example, the cost of sharing information is
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the aggregation of writing a report that is meant to be shared, accessing the sharing platform, taking the
risk of information leakage, etc. Further details regarding these parameters can be found in Section 4.3.
Our model is thus easy to grasp and mathematically tractable, while representing our design and the
real world rather faithfully (although not completely). Slight modifications could make our model more
faithful but also more complex without necessarily providing new insights about the relevant phenomena.
In this context, our current model offers a fair evaluation and justification for our design.
Section 4.1 presents our model; Section 4.2 presents our result stating that exchange of information
occurs regularly; and Section 4.3 discusses how realistic our model is.
4.1 The model
Overview. Let us define a game between two players (defenders) and an attacker. The game consists of
infinitely many rounds. At the end of each round each player may or may not be attacked. A player can
only observe whether herself is attacked, but at the beginning of each round (beside the first round) she
can pay the other player and learn whether the other player was attacked during the previous round. At
the beginning of the first round, the players set their respective selling prices for disclosing an attack. In
the middle of each round, each player may or may not prepare to defend against an attack.
The attacks. In our model, if someone (resp. no one) was attacked during the previous round, each
player is attacked independently with probability q (resp. p < q). By convention, at the first round the
probability q is used instead of p. The attacker’s behavior is represented by the Markov chain in Figure 4,
¬a,¬a a,¬a
¬a, a a, a
p− p2
(1− q)2
q2q − q2p− p2(1− q)2
q2
q − q2
p2
(1− q)2
q − q2
Figure 4: Markov chain example depicting attacker behavior (self loops not displayed).
where, e.g., the pair (a,¬a) means that player 0 is attacked and player 1 is not attacked. To make sure
that the starting probability is q, a dummy starting state at time 0 can be thought as being anything but
(¬a,¬a).
Defense. Whereas attacks happen at the end of each round, decisions to prepare to defend (denoted d),
or not to prepare to defend (denoted ¬d), are made just before, in the middle of each round. If a player
does not defend and the attacker does not attack her, the cost for the player is zero. If the player does not
defend and the attacker performs an attack, the cost is α > 0. If the player defends, the cost is δ > 0
regardless of the attacker’s action.
Trading information. Whereas attacks happen at the end of each round, and the decision to defend is
made in the middle of each round, trade takes place at the beginning of each round. At the first round,
each player i ∈ {0, 1} sets a selling price si once and for all. At the beginning of every other round, each
player may or may not buy, denoted b and ¬b, respectively, the piece of information whether the other
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player was attacked during the previous round. If player i buys and player 1 − i was attacked, player
i pays s1−i to player 1 − i; if player i buys and player 1 − i was not attacked, player i pays nothing.
Moreover, disclosing an attack one has undergone to the other player costs s to oneself.
Playing formally. Let A := {a,¬a}, let B := {b,¬b}, let D := {d,¬d}. A play is a sequence
σd1A1 · b2d2A2 · b3d3A3 · · · ∈ (R2D2A2) · (B2D2A2)N where σ = (s0, s1) ∈ R2, bn = (b0n, b1n) ∈ B2,
dn = (d
0
n, d
1
n) ∈ D2, and An = (A0n, A1n) ∈ A2 9. The Ain are capitalized as a reminder that the attacks
are random variables, as opposed to the other variables relating to decisions of the players.
For example, the finite prefix (3, 2)(¬d, d)(a, a) · (b,¬b)(d, d)(a,¬a) corresponds to two rounds.
For the first round, player 0 and 1 set selling prices 3 and 2, respectively; then only player 1 defends, but
both players are attacked. For the second round, only player 0 buys information, then both defend, but
only player 0 is attacked.
The instant cost for a player during a round. For each player i ∈ {0, 1} let Si
si
: A2B2 → R describe
costs of (not) selling information for price si, and let Bi
s1−i : A
2B2 → R describe costs of (not) buying
information for price s1−i. In the definition of these functions below, the underscore means any argument.
S0s0((a, )( , b)) := s− s0
S1s1(( , a)(b, )) := s− s1
S0s0((¬a, )( , )) := S0s0(( , )( ,¬b)) := S1s1(( ,¬a)( , ))
:= S1s1(( , )(¬b, )) := 0
B0s1(( , a)(b, )) := s
1
B1s0((a, )( , b)) := s
0
B1s0((¬a, )( , )) := B1s0(( , )( ,¬b)) := B0s1(( ,¬a)( , ))
:= B0s1(( , )(¬b, )) := 0
For each player i ∈ {0, 1} let Di : D2A2 → R describe the cost of (not) defending.
D0((d, )( , )) := D1(( , d)( , )) := δ
D0((¬d, )(¬a, )) := D1(( ,¬d)( ,¬a)) := 0
D0((¬d, )(a, )) := D1(( ,¬d)( , a)) := α
Let us now define Cis0,s1 the total instant cost of a round for player i. It is a function from A
2 ·B2D2A2
to the real numbers. Let Cis0,s1(An−1 · bndnAn) := Sisi(An−1 · bn) + Bis1−i(An−1 · bn) +Di(dnAn).
Note that An−1 refers to the attacks at the previous round, so the definition does not apply to the first
round, which will not be an issue since we are interested in average behaviors.
Aggregation of instant costs over time. What each player will optimize is her infinite sequence of
expected instant costs, one such a cost per round. There are several classical ways of comparing sequences
of real numbers, e.g., mean-payoff, which represents long term objectives; or discounted sum, which
represents middle term objectives. Instead, we will use a lexicographic comparison, which represents
short term objectives, i.e., each player minimizes her expected instant cost before minimizing the future
ones.
9The single dot between rounds is just here for readability.
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4.2 Results
In this section we show that, under reasonable assumptions, a pattern relating to the attacks triggers the
players to buy information. Afterwards, we show that this pattern occurs regularly with probability one.
Our special pattern is Ain = a ∧ Ain+1 = ¬a, i.e, player i is attacked at time n but not at time n + 1.
These results are summarized in Theorem 4.
Due to the symmetry between the roles of the two players, several of the concepts and calculations
below are only described from the perspective of Player 0.
Useful probability. Let p′ be the probability that Player 0 is attacked at time n+ 2, if she was attacked
at time n but not at time n+ 1. Hence:
p′ = P(A0n+2 = a |A0n = a ∧A0n+1 = ¬a)
p′ = P(A1n+1 = ¬a |A0n = a) · P(A0n+2 = a |A0n+1 = A1n+1 = ¬a)
+ P(A1n+1 = a |A0n = a) · P(A0n+2 = a |A1n+1 = a)
p′ = (1− q) · p+ q · q
Note that by convex combination we have p < p′ < q.
The cost of not defending. Let us calculate the expected costs of not defending (and not knowing
information), after our special pattern.
• Let C(¬d|(¬a,¬a)) = pα be the expected cost of not defending at time n+ 1, if no player was
attacked at time n.
• Let C(¬d|a) = qα be the expected cost of not defending at time n+ 1, if the player was attacked
at time n.
• Let C(¬d|a¬a) = p′α be the expected cost of Player 0 not defending at time n + 2, after the
pattern A0n = a ∧A0n+1 = ¬a.
If δ ≤ pα, it is optimal for the players to defend all the time, and if qα ≤ δ, it is optimal for the players
never to defend. Hence, we assume that pα < δ < qα in the remainder.
The cost of ignorance. Let us now calculate the expected costs of not knowing information, after our
special pattern.
• Let C(¬b|a¬a) be the expected cost of not buying information at time n + 2, after the pattern
Ain = a ∧ Ain+1 = ¬a. So C(¬b|a¬a) = min(δ, C(¬d|a¬a)) = min(δ, p′α). Indeed, between
defending and not defending, the player will choose one action that minimises the expected cost.
The cost of buying information. We are now ready to define and calculate C(b|a¬a), the expected costs
of buying information after our special pattern.
C(b|a¬a) = P(A1n+1 = ¬a |A0n = a ∧A0n+1 = ¬a) · pα
+ P(A1n+1 = a |A0n = a ∧A0n+1 = ¬a) · (s1 + δ)
C(b|a¬a) = (1− q)pα+ q(s1 + δ)
Lemma 1 below describes two equivalences between inequalities, which are then used to connect
formally small selling price and incentive to buy information after our usual pattern (third inequality
shows that buying is cost-effective).
Lemma 1. 1. (1− q)pα+ q(s1 + δ) ≤ p′α iff s1 ≤ qα− δ.
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2. (1− q)pα+ q(s1 + δ) ≤ δ iff s1 ≤ 1−qq (δ − pα).
3. C(b|a¬a) ≤ C(¬b|a¬a) iff s1 ≤ min(qα− δ, 1−qq (δ − pα)).
Average cycling time. Let us now show that our special pattern occurs regularly. Let La := sup{l |A00 =
· · · = A0l−1 = a} be the duration of a non-stop attack against Player 0 from the beginning. Assuming
that A00 = A
1
0 = 0, let L¬a := sup{l |A01 = · · · = A0l = 0} be the duration of a non-stop truce.
Lemma 2 below describes precisely the expectation ofLa and gives an upper bound for the expectation
of L¬a.
Lemma 2. 1. E(La) = 1q .
2. E(L¬a) ≤ q(1−p)p2
Proof. E(La) =
∑+∞
0 nP(La = n) =
∑+∞
0 nq
n(1− q) = 11−q .
E(L¬a) =
∑+∞
0 nP(L¬a = n) ≤
∑+∞
0 n(1− p)nq = q(1−p)p2 + 1.
Corollary 3. The expected waiting time between two consecutive special patterns (for a given player) is
E(La + L¬a + 1) ≤ 2 + 11−q + q(1−p)p2 .
Theorem 4. 1. If δ ≤ pα, it is optimal to defend all the time, so no player ever needs information.
2. If qα ≤ δ, it is optimal to never defend, so no player ever needs information.
3. If pα < δ < qα, let us further assume that s ≤ min(qα−δ, 1−qq (δ−pα)). Then players minimizing
the costs will choose s0 = s1 = min(qα− δ, 1−qq (δ − pα)), and information is bought on average
at least every 2 + 11−q +
q(1−p)
p2
time units.
Proof. We prove the last statement.
The first time that Player 0 is not attacked is either after the first occurrence of the pattern A0n−1 =
a ∧ A0n = ¬a or at time 0, which is as if A0n−1 = a ∧ A0n = ¬a had just occurred (since Attacker uses
probability q at the beginning.) Since δ < qα, this is first time that Player 0 may need information. At
this time Player 0 would buy information iff s1 ≤ min(qα− δ, 1−qq (δ − pα)). Note that purchase occurs
also for s1 = min(qα− δ, 1−qq (δ − pα))) since the two options give the same expected instant cost, but
buying the information may be also useful for future rounds (which is beyond the scope of this paper).
Therefore the optimal value of s1 (for Player 1) is min(qα− δ, 1−qq (δ − pα)). Likewise, this is also the
optimal value of s0.
4.3 Discussion
This section discusses how realistic our model is. The conclusion will be that despite its simplicity, our
model can incorporate many real-world parameters directly into one of the five abstract parameters, and
that slight modifications (and additions) would account for even finer phenomena without altering the
overall behavior. Therefore our model provides an accurate insight into the usefulness of our design.
The time frame. In the real world, some variables change values quicker than other variables. Moreover,
variables of artificial systems are sometimes not allowed to change values quickly to prevent instability.
When studying such systems, some variables are thus assumed to be constant over a reasonable time span,
which is the case in our model as will be mentioned at several occasions below. Since the premises in
Theorem 4 are inequalities, as opposed to equalities, we could even replace the “constant” assumption by
the weaker assumption that the parameters vary within reasonable bounds.
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The attacks. Correlated attacks: One of the key points of information sharing is that information may
help prepare against attacks. This is possible since there are, in the real world, statistical correlations
between attacks [NCR02, AMW17].
Type of correlation in the real world: correlation between past and present attacks is usually positive.
The more attacks occurred recently, the more attacks are likely to occur next. (An extreme but usual
case is when attacks occur in bursts.) The correlation between attacks over time on different players
is usually also positive. There is a reasonable explanation for that, as attackers often employ a limited
arsenal of attacks (e.g., exploits and known vulnerabilities) against a large number of targets [AMW17],
thus leading to the same or similar attacks being observed repeatedly against different targets. Practical
examples could be a malicious IP trying out default password combinations to get access to remote
machines of several organizations, or a new strain of malware that is used by more and more attackers.
Our four-state Markov chain is a simple way to express both above-mentioned correlations at once; other
more complex expressions would overcomplicate the model, while leading to similar results. After all,
we are not interested in modeling all possible attacks. Our goal is to show that if attacks that match our
model take place regularly, it will be cost-effective for players to collaborate regularly as well. Other
types of attacks will most likely trigger collaboration even more often.
Constant Attacker Markov chain: the probabilities p and q are assumed to be (sufficiently) constant
over a reasonable time span, but of course they need not be constant in the long run.
Blind or coordinated Attacker: First, the attacker’s behavior does not depend on the players’ behavior,
which is sometimes, but not always, realistic. Indeed, we can say that there are two ends in the attacker
behavior spectrum. Either the attacker targets a specific defender with a unique attack (targeted attack),
or the attacker targets large groups of defenders with the same attack. In the former case there is little to
no correlation to other attacks and therefore collaboration altogether may be futile. In the latter case, the
attacker is unlikely to be able to monitor each individual defender closely, and therefore the assumption
holds. Second, at any given time, the attacks against each player are drawn independently, which may
sound unrealistic at first glance, but it would be possible to show that, in our model, if a player is attacked
at a given time, the other player is more likely to be attacked at the same time. This is because the
probability which is used by the attacker is either p for both players or q for both players.
The concept of cost aggregation. Let us exemplify what aggregation means in this context: someone is
cycling to the shop to buy a pair of shoes and a rucksack. The expected cost of this is the price of the
shoes, plus the price of the rucksack, plus the probability of the bike being stolen times the price of the
bike. One can see here that arbitrarily many (expected) costs can be aggregated into one single (expected)
cost without any loss of relevant information, as long as decisions are based on expected costs. This
reduces dramatically the number of variables that are required to build a realistic model. The reason why
there is one cost variable for defense and one for trading information in our model (rather than just one
single variable for both) is because defense and trading do not relate in the same way to the other parts of
the model: whether the player defends is her decision (based on available information); whereas trading
information depends on the selling price and on the decision of the potential buyer.
Defense. Independent cost: in our model the cost of defending is the same regardless of the attacker’s
action. In the real world there may be a difference, but this difference should be small in comparison to
the cost difference when not defending (and being attacked or not). For example, assume an organization
that finds out about a new attack vector and takes actions to patch it (defend). The cost of defending
(paying developers for patching, system downtime, etc.) is mostly independent from whether or not an
attacker will actually try to use this attack vector; especially compared to the cost of falling victim to the
attack. Hence our simplified approximation.
Constant cost: the cost of defending is assumed to be (sufficiently) constant over a reasonable time
span, but of course it need not be constant in the long run.
What makes defending costly: First, note that the prepare/not prepare (defend/not defend) modeling is
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typical of game-theoretic security analysis [MZA+13]. Second, preparing to defend may involve having
the company’s IT team fully dedicated to this task (thus delaying other tasks), employing extra human
personnel (paying extra-hours to employees or temporarily hiring external consultants), limiting access to
organizational resources (e.g. during the application of a security patch), reverse engineering malware,
etc. Note that the defending cost is incurred per time unit, so it does not take into account fixed costs
such as buying (as opposed to renting) special equipment or hiring a security expert for a long time span.
However, this is not a drawback of our model in particular, as it is intrinsic to fixed costs: indeed, it is
irrelevant to “decide” every time unit if we have bought equipment or hired experts in the past.
Trading information. Cost of reporting an attack: As mentioned in the beginning of Section 4, the
cost of sharing information is the aggregation of all the activities related to information sharing. These
activities may or may not include writing a report meant to be shared, accessing the sharing platform,
taking the risk of information leakage (security, privacy), etc. It is assumed to be (sufficiently) constant
over a reasonable time span, but of course it need not be constant in the long run.
Selling price difference: As a matter of design, the price depends on information content. It makes
sense for the following reason: reporting the absence of an attack is easy and safe in most cases, whereas
reporting an attack in detail costs more, as suggested in the paragraph above. It is possible to prove that,
in our model, having a single price would still work, but players would purchase less often.
Constant selling price: In our model the selling prices are chosen by the players once and for all. This
only means that the prices are assumed to be stable over a reasonable time span in the real world (to make
it possible to build a predictable seller-buyer relationship).
Expected costs. The costs considered in the model are generally viewed as constant (over a reasonable
time span). This may, at first, cause confusion, as e.g. the cost of defending when all that is necessary is
adding an IP in a blacklist is orders of magnitude less than the cost of reverse-engineering new malware,
developing and deploying a patch, etc. However, this is not a problem for the model. The players
calculate the costs before they actually occur, i.e. they are expected costs, and make decisions based on
this expectation. Effects of the variation become negligible in the long run.
Aggregation of instant costs over time. Our lexicographic comparison has two advantages, compared
to the aforementioned mean-payoff, etc: first, in the current setting it makes calculations and proofs
easier; second, in our model, information will be bought mainly if it is worth instantly, whereas in other
models it would also be bought if it could be useful later. Yet we will still be able to prove that it is bought
regularly, and then to conclude that it would also be bought regularly (even more often) in other models
with farther-sighted players.
Reputation. Although we use neither explicit parameters nor dedicated mechanisms to express or process
reputation in the model, our model can still account for fixed reputations over the relevant time spans.
Seller reputation: if we want to model that the buying player does not fully trust the information
provided by the selling player, we can modify the corresponding probabilities p and q so as to decrease
their difference (only for the other selling player, not for the player herself). Solving such a refined model
would be similar but a bit more tedious than what we did in Section 4.2.
Buyer reputation: if we want to model that the selling player does not fully trust how the buying player
will use the sold information, she can simply incorporate this distrust in the cost of sharing information.
Number of players. In our model there are only two defending players. If we want to consider a large
number of players, the selling price should become near-optimal for every player (for game-theoretic
reasons), thus further supporting the exchange of information.
In addition, while the assumption pα < δ < qα seems natural (outside of this interval, there is
nothing to do), the condition s ≤ min(qα− δ, 1−qq (δ − pα)) reminds us that this comes from a specific
model. However, the latter condition should be understood as “if the disclosure cost is small enough”,
and the conclusion should then hold in other models.
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Lastly, in our model, other patterns than our special pattern may trigger purchase of information,
possibly for smaller selling prices, but we have not investigated this. Indeed our main point was only to
show that information is exchanged on a regular basis if the disclosure cost is small enough.
5 Prototype and evaluation
In this section, we present our prototype implementation of TRIDEnT. Specifically, we present eth-
TRIDEnT, running on Ethereum. The code can straightforwardly be modified to run on permissioned
platforms, e.g., Hyperledger Fabric.
Smart contract pseudocode: In Smart Contract 1 we provide a pseudocode description of the most
notable parts of the backbone smart contract Bmarket, which provides the basic functionality of TRIDEnT.
We loosely follow the notation of [KMS+16], with $ prepended to variables associated to some form of
currency (tokens), and CLT standing for the client (e.g. Ethereum wallet address) who calls the function.
The initialization of the data structures is omitted for space reasons. The logic of the contract is not trivial,
and therefore we proceed to provide a brief overview.
The register function allows clients to register in the system with a public key pk and initializes
their balance (ledger) and ratings set. This initial balance provided in Ether cannot be retrieved from the
contract and is therefore considered a form of coin burning even though the value invested is useful inside
the system10 . Only registered clients can call any of the following functions. The advertise function
allows clients to post advertisements accompanied by tags (see line 10) in the marketplace. The function
rmAdvert allows clients that have posted an advertisement to remove it from the marketplace, while
returning fees and deposits held by the contract to their rightful recipients. The mkOffer function adds an
offer to a specific advertisement already existing in the marketplace. A fee (initial payment to the seller if
the offer is accepted) and a deposit (incentive to provide rating) are withheld by the contract. The delOffer
function allows the offer maker or the advertiser to delete (take back or turn down respectively) an offer
and send the tokens withheld by the contract to the offer maker. Moving on, the accOffer function allows
clients that have made advertisements to accept offers for them, claiming the initial fee and providing
the encrypted (ip:port) information needed to establish the stream (see SE protocol of Figure 2). The
unsubscribe function allows clients that have either posted an advertisement or are subscribed to one,
to remove their subscription. Finally, rate allows clients to provide a rating about a client that made an
advertisement about a stream they are subscribed to. Upon their first rating for a given subscription, they
receive their deposit back.
eth-TRIDEnT: We implemented our smart contracts in Solidity v0.4.25. We created two contracts,
namely AlertExchange.sol and Token.sol. The former is the heart of the prototype, implement-
ing the functions described in pseudocode above; the latter implements a simple ERC-20 token used as
the system’s currency. In order to mint the token, a node has to burn ETH. Micro-transaction channels
were implemented by calls to the already deployed µ-Raiden contract. When it comes to evaluating smart
contracts, transaction costs (in Ethereum: Gas fees), i.e. fees paid by users to miners, are an important
metric and the usual way of arguing about the feasibility of an approach.
In Table 5, we show the transaction costs of the functions of the Alert Exchange contract, as calculated
after deployment to the Rinkeby test network. The smart contracts can be found at the following addresses
on Rinkeby:
–Alert Exchange: 0x682528b9cc9b74ca00efb004a4619fabd6f5cd69
–Token: 0x380ab69f3230c1990c9bbf4ecdcfefc6bd26501c
–Raiden Channels: 0x83aeb45854e1ac54f5d9fa42fd7a79b398aa50cf
The code of the main contract (AlertExchange) was verified and can be easily inspected at Ether-
10Traditional “wasteful” burning can naturally also be employed.
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Smart Contract 1: The Backbone contract Bmarket
1 Function register:
2 Upon receiving (register, $payment, pk) from CLT:
3 ledger[’CLT’] := $payment
4 ratings[’CLT’] := ∅
5 key[’CLT’] := pk
6 parties := parties ∪ (CLT)
7 Function advertise:
8 Upon receiving (advertise, tags) from CLT:
9 ASSERT CLT ∈ parties
/* This assertion is repeated in all subsequent funtions, but omitted for
clarity */
10 adv = (tags, CLT, {∅}, {∅})
11 adverts := adverts ∪ adv
12 Function rmAdvert:
13 Upon receiving (rmAdv, adv) from CLT:
14 ASSERT adv∈ adverts, CLT = adv[1] // see line 10
15 adverts := adverts \ adv
16 Return pending offer fees and deposits to offer makers
17 Function mkOffer:
18 Upon receiving (makeOffer, adv, $fee, $deposit) from CLT:
19 ASSERT adv ∈ adverts
20 ledger[’CLT’] := ledger[’CLT’] - $fee - $deposit
21 ledger[this] := ledger[this] + $fee + $deposit
/* tokens transferred to the contract itself (this) */
22 offer = (CLT, fee) // offer[0] = CLT, offer[1] = fee
23 adv[2] := adv[2] ∪ offer
24 Function delOffer:
25 Upon receiving (dlOffer, offer) from CLT:
26 ASSERT ∃ adv ∈ adverts: offer ∈ adv[2], (CLT = offer[0] OR CLT = adv[1]) // CLT is advert owner
or has made the offer
27 adv[2] = adv[2] \ offer
28 Return $fee and $deposit to offer maker
29 Function accOffer:
30 Upon receiving (acceptOffer, offer, c) from CLT:
31 ASSSERT ∃ adv ∈ adverts: offer ∈ adv[2], CLT = adv[1]
32 sub = (offer[0], false, offer[1], c) // c = Enc(ip:port)
33 adv[3] = adv[3] ∪ sub
34 ledger[’CLT’] := ledger[’CLT’] + offer[1] // claim initial $fee
35 ledger[this] := ledger[this] - offer[1]
36 delOffer(offer)
37 Function unsubscribe:
38 Upon receiving (unsubscribe, sub) from CLT:
39 ASSERT ∃ adv ∈ adverts: sub ∈ adv[3], (CLT = adv[1] OR CLT = sub[0]) // CLT is advert owner
or subscriber
40 adv[3] = adv[3] \ sub
41 Function rate:
42 Upon receiving (rate, sub, rating) from CLT:
43 ASSERT ∃ adv ∈ adverts: sub ∈ adv[3] CLT = sub[0], // CLT is a subscriber
44 ratings[adv[1]] := ratings[adv[1]] ∪ rating
/* if rating for the first time */
45 if sub[1] = false then
46 ledger[’CLT’] := ledger[’CLT’] + deposit
47 ledger[this] := ledger[this] - deposit
48 sub[1] := true
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Cost
Function Gas Gwei EUR
current current peak
deploy 3 994 723 15 978 892 2.88 99.68
register 54 672 218 688 0.04 1.36
advertise 173 279 693 116 0.12 4.32
rmAdvert 41 257 165 028 0.03 1.03
mkOffer 194 381 777 524 0.14 4.85
delOffer 25 820 103 280 0.02 0.64
accOffer 756 014 3 024 056 0.54 18.86
unsubscribe 34 139 136 556 0.02 0.85
rate 46 663 186 652 0.03 1.16
Table 5: Trans. costs at the time of writing (Sep’18) and the peak of Ethereum price and network load
(Jan’18) (last col.).
scan11. For the calculation of the transaction costs, the gas price was set to 4 Gwei (4 · 10−9 ETH) and
the ETH/EUR exchange rate to 180.00, according to observations at the time of writing12. Among the
transaction costs of the methods, the cost for accepting an offer stands out. This is because the method
contains the deletion of an offer, as well as the creation of a subscription. Subscriptions are the contracts’
biggest data structures, which makes them relatively expensive to save. As an example, the establishment
of a stream would cost a total of under 1 EUR at the time of writing and under 30 EUR considering the
worst-ever price and network traffic13. As these streams are projected to be relatively long-lived, these
costs are expected to be negligible for firms. Note that the contract deployment cost is a one-time cost for
the whole lifetime of the system. The implementation of the AlertExchange contract consists of 423
lines of Solidity code and a detailed report on the engineering obstacles we encountered will follow in an
extended version of the paper.
Client-side application: In order to make interaction with the deployed smart contracts user-friendly,
we also developed a client-side command-line application consisting of around 2 000 lines of JavaScript
code. The application calls the smart contract methods using the web3 JavaScript API14. It enables
all necessary functionalities for viewing, advertising, subscribing, and rating alert streams, as well as
calculating trust values for participants. Furthermore, the client-application allows parties to provide an
endpoint from which subscribers can download alerts, authenticates the subscribers and validates that the
alert batches are paid for.
6 Related work
In this section we focus on the related work with regard to incentives and trust for CIDSs, as well as on
collaborative platforms that exist nowadays. For a holistic view on game-theoretical approaches in a
variety of network security setting, and economic studies of information sharing, we refer the reader to
the surveys of Mansaei et al. [MZA+13], and Laube and Bo¨hme [LB17]. For a summary of CIDSs the
reader can refer to Section 2.
Gal-Or and Ghose [GOG05] propose a game-theoretic model for information-sharing in cyber-
security. They conclude that although information sharing is beneficial to firms, with no additional
11https://rinkeby.etherscan.io/address/0x682528b9cc9b74ca00efb004a4619fabd6f5cd69
12According to https://ethgasstation.info/. September 2018.
1315th January 2018. ETH/EUR: 1134.20, Average gas price: 22 Gwei.
14https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/JavaScript-API
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incentives and anti-free-riding mechanisms, they may not be encouraged to participate truthfully. This
work acted as a motivation for TRIDEnT. Despite the significant work that has been done in the areas of
collaborative security [MLZ+15] and CIDSs [VKMF15, ZLK10], only a very small portion of it deals
with incentives and trust among the participants. That is, the majority of the related work assumes that all
the participants are honest, trustworthy and willing to collaborate. Duma et al. [DKSC06], were one of
the first to propose a simple trust model for CIDSs. However, their model is prone to insider attacks (e.g.,
betrayal attacks). Fung et al. also examined this field, proposing more advanced mechanisms in their
incremental works [FBZ+08, FZAB11], and attempted to deal with the aforementioned insider attack
challenge.
Zhu et al. [ZFBB12], touch the topic of incentives in CIDSs and propose a game-theoretical model
that ensures that peers of the system contribute equally (in terms of computational power). This work
is very relevant for us, however it is limited only to incentives that are connected to the computational
power of the overall system as well as to the resource allocation problem. Hence, this work does not
take into account the bigger picture of collaborative security; e.g., the incentives for an organization to
join a collaborative ecosystem, the economics of such a system, etc. Similarly, Guo et al. investigate
incentives for CIDSs in mobile ad-hoc networks [GZZ+18]. They propose an auction process using
virtual credits and model cooperative detection as an evolutionary game. Although they also use a form of
virtual currency, their setting is substantially different than ours (completely different assumptions) and
they do not consider trust relations among collaborators. Jin et al. [JHD17] propose a privacy-protection
mechanism for CIDS where participants are trustworthy and misreport (share false information) with
a known probability to protect their privacy. In our view, misreporting is not an option for real-world
systems, and privacy must be preserved by proper data sanitization and forming collaboration overlays
with trustworthy partners, as enabled by TRIDEnT. Finally, the idea of using blockchain technology and
smart contracts to enable collaboration in the security domain has been pitched in several interesting
recent works [AVIM17, MTW+18, WHH+18]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive
incentive analysis or concrete instantiation for network alert sharing have been proposed before. In the
start-up world, PolySwarm [Pol18] is creating a prediction marketplace for the classification of malware.
This is an interesting idea and could be integrated with TRIDEnT on a single platform.
Finally, besides the aforesaid (mostly academic) work, a number of practical real-world alert data
sharing platforms exist. The Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) is one such example of a
collaborative platform that has been used by several organizations [WDWI16]. Initially MISP, as its
original name implies, mainly focused on malware exchange; over the years though, it has been practically
extended to more alert types over the years. However, MISP does not tackle the incentives topic, nor
the trust and alert quality aspect. In addition, due to its structure (closed system that requires a formal
process to enroll) attacks on it (internal or external) have not been extensively investigated. Other similar
systems that have been proposed include IBM’s X-Force Exchange15, Facebook’s ThreatExchange16 and
DShield17. These platforms are in principle closed systems that focus on a one-to-many or many-to-many
exchange of low level (e.g., raw) data between entities [LB17]. In many cases, the diversity of shared
data is very limited; for instance, the Facebook ThreatExchange is only dealing with Facebook alerts to
assist Facebook API developers. Note that we do not view TRIDEnT as a competitor to existing sharing
platforms, which have solved a lot of practical problems concerning the structure and mechanics of the
actual data transmission and correlation (with the most promising, in our opinion, being MISP), but rather
as an underlying important incentives layer.
15https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
16https://developers.facebook.com/programs/threatexchange
17https://www.dshield.org
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7 Generalization and limitations
In this section, we discuss how our system can generalize to other types of shared data, as well as what
limitations exist.
Generalization In essence, TRIDEnT is a generic streaming marketplace, and thus could be used for
sharing any kind of information, and not just security alerts. However, the importance, numerous
challenges, as well as the unique risk incurred by both buying and selling alerts, make the functionalities
offered by TRIDEnT necessary. Despite its limitations (see below), we consider TRIDEnT to be a
considerable step towards increased security collaboration in practice; not only among big companies and
organizations, but open to anyone. Also, the format of TRIDEnT’s advertisement and alerts is naturally
not limited to Snort-style alerts. The system can be used to establish streams where e.g. bloom filters
or pre-trained machine learning models are exchanged, allowing greater real-time detection capabilities.
The stream establishment functionality could even be employed in order to run privacy-preserving CIDS
on raw data using secure multiparty computation (SMC) in the future. The main challenges of incentives,
alert quality and trust would still be present to some extent in any case. We consider the field to be
important and ripe for research progress after a stagnant period.
Limitations Considering our system’s limitations, an important one is that it has not been tested in the
wild, since the financial cost of developing and supporting production-ready software (and more so
security-critical software), greatly exceeds our research budget. Moreover, the game-theoretic model
necessarily abstracts away some variables of the real world and can be extended to take into account more
phenomena (such as synergized returns). Additionally, the stream reselling attack (see Section 3.5) may
require new mitigation mechanisms.
8 Conclusion
A lack of incentives has resulted in underwhelming adoption of CIDSs, although technical means
are available. In this work, we described the end-to-end development of TRIDEnT, a decentralized
marketplace for network alert sharing. We started from the inception of the concept, and proceeded to the
system design, game-theoretic analysis, and full prototype implementation. Our simple, yet insightful
game-theoretic analysis of the problem may be of independent interest, and is open to further development.
Although all details and parameters of a real-world deployment of such a system may be excessively
difficult to capture in a game-theoretic model, our model is a necessary first step and offers a degree of
validation to our concept. Ideally, our next step would be to find interested parties and experiment with a
real-world TRIDEnT alert exchange network, possibly with MISP as the overlay platform (and TRIDEnT
as the trust underlay).
As a future step, it would be interesting to model interdependencies among the defenders [KH03,
LFB15] in TRIDEnT and craft incentives to increase overall security investment. Other open challenges
include support for varying degrees of data sanitization depending on the trust relation among collabora-
tors, and privacy-preserving reputation and overlay formation. Finally, the market should be analyzed
towards its tendencies to build monopolies, as this could be detrimental to its success. As a concluding
remark, we believe that the community should invest more resources in collaborative security research,
especially in light of recent advances in the field, like privacy-preserving machine learning.
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A Significance of trust estimates
N is a threshold number of evidence needed to achieve a desired level of significance of the estimate,
in the sense of a confidence interval. The value N is given by the following expression (from [Hau15]),
assuming a desired significance parameter z, and a certainty level c > 0, which is the length of the
100(1− z)% confidence interval.
N =
−κ2 · (2u2 − 4t+ 4t2) +√4u2 · κ4 · (1− u2) + κ4 · (2u2 − 4t+ 4t2)2
2u2
(6)
where u = 1− c and κ the 100(1− z2) percentile of the standard normal distribution. It is notable that
the value of N computed in this way is not constant, yet it depends on the ration of positive and negative
experiences considered.
Assume we want to collect evidence until we have enough (N ) to calculate an estimate with a
100 · (1 − z)% confidence interval (CI) of length 1 − c. The a priori information, in the form of the
baseline trust value, fades away gradually, and disappears completely when the number of collected
evidence reaches N . In our case, we choose to consider an 80% CI of length 0.2. This means that the
actual value associated with a point estimate t, falls with probability 0.8 in the interval (t− 0.1, t+ 0.1).
This leads to a number of required evidence to fade out the prior value completely, in the “best-case
scenario” (point estimate - average value t = 0 or t = /1), N = 7 pieces of evidence. In the worst
case scenario (t = 0.5), N = 40. Even in the worst case, 14 evidence pieces are enough to fade out the
initial value almost completely (ce = 0.92). Therefore, an implementation can either compute N from
equation 6 or choose a constant N value in the range of [10, 15], which, by rule of thumb, will lead to
similar results.
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